In April 2017, the largest non-nuclear weapon "Mother of All Bombs" in the US arsenal crashed into a hillside in Achin, eastern Afghanistan, targeting the "Islamic State" of Afghanistan (known as "Islamic A tunnel network controlled by the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP). But on the satellite image, another pit is only a few hundred meters away from the impact zone: it is a sign of large-scale mining along the valley. ISKP-controlled Afghan territory is limited, but it includes some of Afghanistan's rich mineral resources, especially talc, chromite and marble.
There is contradictory evidence about how much minerals they have mined so far: from the existing satellite imagery, there is no vehicle trail in the area dominated by ISKP near the Momand Valley in the Achin district. Some news People denied that mining had taken place since ISKP captured the area in mid-2015. At the same time, several other credible sources reported that ISKP did benefit at least to some extent from mining and mining trade taxes, and that their control over mines was more stringent than the Taliban.
Regardless of reality, the danger is obvious. Natural resources have long been a part of the ISKP strategy in other countries, and this seems to have been confirmed in Afghanistan. At the end of 2017, ISKP and the Taliban competed for control of other mineral-rich areas near Aqin, resulting in the displacement of more than 60,000 people: a Taliban official made it clear that the intensity of the battle was related to the competition for mineral resources. An Afghan police source said that ISKP had tried to build a road to smuggle minerals from the southern border to Pakistan. As early as 2015, an Afghan ISKP commander described the mine controlling another mineral-rich province as a priority priority, saying: “We will seize the mine at any cost.â€
However, threats from ISKP are just one of the striking examples of resources around Afghanistan, and the dangers of conflict and corruption are particularly acute. In Nangarhar, our research documents the Taliban's control of the talc trade, which has brought millions of dollars to talc trade in just a few regions. In areas reportedly controlled by the Taliban, satellite imagery shows the existence of a large number of activities, including the use of heavy machinery, and trucks carrying minerals are routinely taxed. According to reports, the deal was dominated by strong political backgrounds, and corruption caused the government to lose millions of dollars in revenue. In addition to Nangarhar, mining has been a major source of income for insurgents, strong men and illegal militias, and is a major contributor to instability throughout the country.
Among the conflict minerals, talc is probably the most inconspicuous one, and most of its value ultimately comes from the United States and Europe. Our research shows that almost all Afghan talc has generated income for the Taliban, and almost all talc is exported to Pakistan. Most of Pakistan’s exports actually come from Afghanistan: its largest single market is the United States, followed by European countries. It is almost certain that consumers in these countries have unwittingly funded the insurgency.
It is not easy to deal with this challenge. There are some basic measures that are realistic and useful, but the government and its allies have not yet been implemented. Applying direct pressure is part of the solution. Minerals such as talc and marble require trucking and are relatively easy to intercept. The government can do more to strengthen control of Pakistan's trade and even the supply chain. Another measure is to pay more attention to the safety of the mining area, but this is obviously difficult and dangerous: in the case of armed groups controlling the mine, it is difficult to deal with the problem of illegal mining.
These measures will help deal directly with the “Islamic State†and the Taliban, but if other powerful forces continue to abuse, the benefits of returning mines to government control will be limited. If a vacuum is created to fill the resulting vacuum with a cleaner mining industry that benefits all Afghans, it will be difficult to replace it. In any case, the final outcome should be: not to close the trade, but to legalize it. In other words, the interest of the “Islamic State†in Afghan minerals is a warning to Afghanistan and its allies: not only to combat extremist armed groups, but also to carry out broader reforms – this is what the industry has been lacking so far. .
Based on the three core principles of transparency, community interest and monitoring, and strengthening oversight, some very realistic measures can help implement this reform. These include amending the law, making the contract a valid condition for the contract; establishing a single transparent account for all payments as a condition for payment; using the Community Development Councils network to deliver a percentage of the local community Mining income.
If ordinary traders and local communities can profit from legal mining, this will give them reason (to the extent possible) to boycott armed groups or corrupt dictators to take over resources, so that the government’s political pressure to turn a blind eye will be alleviated. .
As far as the Afghan government is concerned, it relies on mining to finance its budget and promote economic growth, and specifically targets talc as a priority development. But without more powerful action, it is difficult to see these visions become a reality. To be fair, the government acknowledges that it is aware of this problem, and that it should be truly praised for its open mining contracts and its firm commitment to more systematic reforms. However, in the actual implementation of these reforms, progress has been limited: key measures such as revenue transparency and community interests often remain at the stage of ideas and have not been implemented, and revisions to the mining law are still under discussion.
The 2015 ban on talc trade indicates that the government can impose effective restrictions on illegal mining, but under the pressure of traders, the government has lifted the ban within a few months. And overall, the international community has not responded enough (with the exception of a few countries): For example, the main concern of the Trump administration seems to be to urge the Afghan government to give US companies access to a larger stake in Afghanistan.
The challenge is huge – especially for the Afghan government, which faces many other problems, especially large-scale insurgency. None of our recommendations is a panacea. However, even if the Afghan government and its partners cannot solve the problem of illegal mining in all regions, they can start from a limited number of key areas (such as the Nangarhar mining area), focusing on the safety of these areas as a demonstration of reform. And carry out higher levels of change within its control. Nangarhar strongly proves that if no action is taken, it can be expected that the resources of Afghanistan will bring more harm than good. This is a threat that cannot be ignored.
Advice to the Afghan government, the president and the chief executive
1. Restrict illegal mining of armed groups in Nangarhar
Prevent talc, chromite, marble and other minerals from transiting through the Nangarhar region under the influence of illegal armed groups, while acting as soon as possible to create conditions for “clean†mining, even if such mining was initially carried out only in limited areas.
In the security strategy, the protection of resource-rich key areas and related transit routes (including the Nangarhar mining site) will be given a higher priority. Give priority to political means as much as possible.
Ensuring that any law enforcement or security action is closely related to the broader measures listed below, as well as to consultations with local communities and the protection of livelihoods, provided that this does not undermine efforts to exclude armed groups and dictators from trade.
2. Provide reasons for local communities to support legal mining
Establish effective mechanisms for communities to share legitimate revenues, community monitoring of mining, and ownership of mines by communities or workshops. Ensure that local communities are able to control which projects their income is used for under appropriate safeguards, including transparency and community monitoring. As a first option, consider allocating funds as a supplement to the Community Development Committee budget.
In Nangarhar, getting the community to benefit or own the mine is a core part of further efforts to reduce the impact of insurgents in the region.
3. Reforming laws and regulatory systems to make illegal mining more difficult and make legal mining more attractive
Implement basic transparency and regulatory reforms to increase the difficulty of indiscriminate exploitation and create space for legal exploitation of the country and local communities. especially:
In the next six months, the mining laws and regulations will be revised to achieve the following objectives:
1) Make the announcement of the contract a valid condition for the contract.
2) Request to publish production and payment data.
3) A transparent single sub-account is required for a single account of the Treasury to receive payments from all mining industries as a condition of receipt of payment and to be published at least quarterly. The published statement must clearly state the item for each payment and the basis for the payment, such as production and grade.
4) Establish a public register of beneficial ownership and require the company to register and update its records as a condition for bidding or obtaining a government contract.
Strengthen the regulatory capacity and regulatory practices of the Ministry of Mines, particularly information and contract management, cadastre, community relations and inspection functions. Establish mechanisms to enhance the management capabilities of workshops and small-scale mining.
Reform the contracting process to enhance transparency and ensure that companies are treated fairly. From the mining concession contract model to the licensing model. At the very least, a model contract with civil society, local communities and mining companies is required, incorporating the most robust existing anti-corruption and anti-conflict protection measures.
4. Use satellite imagery to monitor key mining sites
Using satellite imagery, including optical and radar data, the system monitors key mining sites. All images are automatically available to the public at commercially available resolutions for transparent and broad-based monitoring of the site and sharing of higher resolution images with recognized, trusted civil society organizations.
5. Control the supply chain
Work with trading partners and consumer countries to exercise strong control over supply chains from conflict-affected areas, including requiring Afghan companies and major importing companies to conduct due diligence.
Advice for international partners in Afghanistan
1. Support Afghanistan’s efforts to strengthen resource governance
Adequate material and political for the government's reform of mining governance – especially the mining-related measures discussed in the Natio nal Anti-Corruption action plan and the reform of the Ministry of Mines stand by. Clearly prioritize strengthening regulation, governance and conflict prevention.
Provide or fund the Afghan government to obtain high-resolution satellite imagery to enable it to monitor the key mining sites described above and to direct its own information analysis agencies to expose and understand the links between resources, armed groups and corrupt elements.
All importing countries of Afghan minerals, oil and gas should commit to requiring their companies to conduct risk assessments and due diligence on their supply chains, at least to the OECD Guidelines for the Due Diligence of Minerals Responsible Supply Chains in Conflict-High Risk Areas ( The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Respo nsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Co nflict Affected High Risk Areas).
2. Prioritize strengthening resource management when engaging with Afghanistan
Incorporate the most important extractive industry governance reforms into the core benchmarks for mutual accountability between the Afghan government and its partners. A more detailed single common benchmark was agreed to secure donor support to the Ministry of Mines.
Instruct the Afghan government to fulfil its existing commitment to strengthen natural resource governance and to raise the need for urgent reform through the highest level of political participation.
Avoid signing new natural resource contracts for any pressure in areas where conflict or armed groups are at higher risk or before basic protection (as described above) takes effect. Focusing on its work in Afghanistan is focused on implementing these measures as soon as possible.
related data
By 2021, the global talc industry is expected to grow to approximately $3.29 billion. It is estimated that in 2017 the United States imported 380,000 tons of talc. According to the US Geological Survey, an average of about 35% of imports from the United States come from Pakistan. According to our research, we also estimate that 80% of Pakistan's talc exports in 2016 actually came from Afghanistan. Of these exports, 42% flow to the United States, and another 36% to the EU countries, mainly the Netherlands and Italy.
Sensor Night Light,Led Strip For Sensor,Motion Sensor Night Light,Auto Sensor Night Light
NINGBO ZHENGUO INTELLINGENT LIGHTING CO.,LTD , https://www.intellingentlighting.com